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Abstract 
 
A two-country, two-period model of international migration with heterogeneous 
agents highlights microeconomic foundations for examining the interrelation between 
brain drain, brain gain and whether human capital formation is undertaken at home or 
abroad.  Ex ante choices regarding where to study depend on abilities, relative qualities of 
university systems, sunk educational investments, government grants, and endogenously 
determined, individual foreign employment probabilities.  Self-selection critically defines 
an inherently wide-range of conceivably positive or negative net welfare effects.  The 
optimal design of alternative educational grant schemes, aimed at enhancing the source 
country’s welfare, also depends on the heterogeneity of abilities and associated 
informational assumptions. 
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Section I:  Introduction 
 
Spawned by the noteworthy contribution of Bhagwati and Hamada 
(1974), the potentially adverse impact of the migration of skilled workers on 
a home country’s growth and welfare has long been a key research concern.  
Nonetheless, early investigations also recognized conceivable advantageous 
effects for source countries, due to possible remittances and to temporary 
mobility, whereby migrants return from abroad with enhanced skills due to 
foreign job training.  Another potentially important source of such brain 
gain, which is independent from return migration was identified by 
Mountford (1997) and Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997), in what 
Schiff (2006) has termed the “new brain drain literature”.  Specifically, 
although migration can generate a loss of domestic talent, it can also prompt 
an upsurge in the overall educational level of a home country, as a result of 
higher propensities to invest in human capital.  Attractive foreign labour 
market conditions offer heightened incentives for domestic workers to strive 
to attain higher qualification levels, whether or not they ultimately find jobs 
abroad, thereby fostering, ceteris paribus, increases in average productivity 
levels at home.1  Yet, until recently, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the question of whether distinctive brain drain and gain effects may arise, 
depending on the extent to which educational investments take place either 
in home and/or host countries.  Notably, pronounced international 
differences in educational quality and policies suggest a need to analyse 
explicitly individuals’ arbitrage decisions regarding where optimal 
investments in human capital formation should take place.  Such a focus is 
particularly warranted in light of the perceived high stakes and associated 
policy concerns arising from the increased international mobility of skilled 
workers.2   
 
The potentially critical role of international educational choices on 
subsequent professional mobility, which has also been considered by both 
Rosenzweig (2008) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012), is particularly 
germane for motivating the modelling framework proposed in the current 
research.  More specifically, Rosenzweig suggests two crucial limitations of 
existing approaches to the analysis of brain drain and gain.  A first remark is 
that the potential impact of the “‘risk’ of emigrating” for “domestically-
                                                 
1
 While macroeconomic frameworks with representative agents, such as in Vidal (1998) and in Stark and 
Zakharenko (2012), have examined the interrelation between international migration and domestic human capital 
formation, most existing approaches consider microeconomic decisions for a set of homogeneous individuals, as 
in the work of Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997).  
2
  See, for example, Leipziger (2008), OECD (2008), Solimano (2008), as well as Docquier and Rapoport (2012) 
for  comprehensive surveys, which examine evidence regarding how the interface between globalization and brain 
drain/gain effects can impact the economic interests of source countries, depending on their levels of economic 
development.  
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educated tertiary educated person(s)” is de facto quite minimal.  A second 
suggestion is that “the literature ignores the endogeneity of the emigration 
probability”, while arguing that, in fact, “the choice of the location of 
tertiary education significantly affects the probability that the person can 
emigrate.”3(p. 61)  In this regard, Docquier and Rapoport  observed that 
“…workers trained at destination enjoy higher wages and employment rates 
than workers trained in their countries of origin…” (p. 693).   
 
Nonetheless, much of the existing migration literature has left largely 
unexplored the extent to which brain drain/gain effects and the optimal 
design of government educational policies are conditioned by the 
heterogeneity of students’ abilities, associated self-selection mechanisms and 
issues of informational asymmetries.4  The present research responds to this 
lacuna by proposing a two-country, heterogeneous agent model, which offers 
a new theoretical paradigm for understanding the nexus between students’ 
initial locational choices regarding human capital formation, differences in 
national labour market conditions, and international migration.  The 
analysis underscores how net economic welfare in a home country can be 
impacted by an inherently wide-range of conceivable positive or negative 
categories of brain drain and gain effects, while also focusing on the optimal 
design of domestically financed educational grants (in a developing country).   
 
Unique contributions result from an endogenous specification of the 
probabilities of foreign employment (brain drain) and return mobility (brain 
gain), which critically depend on heterogeneity of abilities.  Such a 
formulation introduces a new dimension to associated calculations of 
economic welfare, since evaluations of such migration need to be quality-
weighted and do not just reflect numbers of migrants.  Crucially also, the 
heterogeneity of agents generates both ex ante and ex post self-selection 
mechanisms, along with potential issues of asymmetric information between 
public authorities and individuals.  Such considerations, neglected in 
frameworks not incorporating sources of agent-specific heterogeneity, 
condition the extent of migration flows, as well as the efficacy and optimal 
                                                 
3
  While the analytical framework proposed by Rosenzweig does not allow for differences in individual abilities, 
his empirical findings are consistent with a number of the modeling assumptions which are subsequently invoked 
here.  Notably, he reports evidence that students are motivated by foreign studies in order to obtain employment in 
a host country and that quality differences in university systems also appear to trigger the decision to study abroad. 
4
 Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1998) propose a scenario where each potential migrant faces identical 
probabilities of finding a job abroad, while in Stark (2004) there is a minimum threshold level of qualification.  
Mountford (1997) and Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001, 2008)) investigate models where an individual’s 
decision is of a binary form – whether to undertake education, or not - while the probability of finding foreign 
employment is exogenous.  Hence, migrants are randomly selected.  In contrast, Chiswick (1999) provides for 
self-selection by two categories of potential migrants individuals, such that the rate of return is greater for higher-
ability individuals.   
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design of educational policies aimed at promoting national welfare.5  The 
heterogeneity of abilities also accentuates the potential effects of differences 
in the quality of international educational offerings on the post-educational 
productivity of workers, relative to a more standard framework where 
individuals are assumed to have equal talents.  Heterogeneity typically 
generates potential threshold levels determining where individuals will chose 
to be educated, along with how government educational policies need to be 
tailored to such decisions.   
 
The analysis of how the impact of educational policies and systems on 
international migration can depend on agent heterogeneity has also been 
explored recently by Lange (2013) and Demange and Fenge (2010).  A 
central concern is with the efficacy of different government educational 
strategies, including tuition cost policies and the quality of educational 
offerings, aimed at enhancing a country’s public finances or national 
welfare.  In this regard Lange (2013) has proposed a model in which students 
are heterogeneous in terms of their preferences for staying on abroad to 
work, following education in a host country, rather than in their abilities, as 
proposed here.  The focus is on the optimal determination of tuition fees 
from the perspective of a developed host country.  Demange and Fenge 
(2010) have developed a model of international student mobility in a two-
country gaming framework.  As in the analysis proposed here, the 
educational choices of students are heterogeneous in terms of their abilities.  
In light of cost-benefit evaluations, countries compete to attract capable 
students, who seek to invest in higher quality educational offerings.  
Nonetheless, there is also a critical difference, relative to the modelling 
framework formulated here, since the probability that an individual will 
return home is exogenously specified.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 the basic 
modelling analysis starts with a sub-model of ex ante individual choice, 
regarding whether to undertake human capital formation at home or 
abroad.  An individual’s underlying ability determines known productivity 
gains from studying abroad, along with expected probabilities of 
subsequently obtaining foreign market employment at higher wages.  The 
initial focus is on characterizing the ex post net impact of brain drain and 
brain gain on domestic economic welfare, which involves potential tradeoffs 
between productivity and social investment costs.  Section 3 then presents 
                                                 
5
 The insight, formulated by Melitz (2003), that exporting firms are self-selected in terms of their productivity 
levels has spawned a reformulation of a significant part of the international trade literature.  Yet, models of 
international migration, based on heterogeneous agents, are much less prevalent. Recent contributions in this 
regard include Krieger and Lange (2010), Lange (2013), Demange and Fenge (2010), and Demange, Fenge, and 
Uebelmesser (2014).  
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some comparative static results, relating to the welfare effects of changing 
key model parameters.  A critical insight is that, in general, the associated 
net welfare effects can be either positive or negative.  In Section 4 the relative 
welfare implications of alternative educational grant schemes, providing 
subsidies for foreign studies, are examined under alternative informational 
assumptions.  A concluding section briefly summarizes certain salient 
findings, while identifying directions for further inquiry. 
 
 
Section II:  Basic Modelling Framework 
 
Essential features of the proposed conceptual framework include the 
following: 
1) Individuals, from a home country, choose whether to undertake 
studies at home or abroad, where the latter entail an incrementally 
higher sunk investment cost.  Foreign studies are understood to 
generate greater improvements in labour-market productivity, as 
compared with levels achievable through domestic human capital 
formation, where, crucially, the extent of realizable gains depends on 
underlying abilities across a heterogeneous population of individuals.  
If subsequently offered foreign employment, students opt to stay 
abroad because of higher wages, thereby generating brain drain.  
However, if individuals are unable to find suitable foreign 
employment, they still enjoy heightened productivity levels and wages, 
when returning home, as compared with workers who have not 
studied abroad.  This generates brain gain.6 
2) When modelling an individual’s choice of whether to study abroad or 
stay at home, a crucial variable is the probability of being hired in the 
foreign labour market. Contrary to other models in which this 
probability is exogenous and identical for all graduates, it is assumed 
here to be a function of each individual’s attainable level of 
qualification or, alternatively, productivity, where the latter depends 
on both individuals’ abilities and the quality of educational institutions 
at home and abroad.  As a consequence, migrants are “favourably self-
selected” to use the terminology of Chiswick (1999). 
3) The criterion chosen to assess brain drain/brain gain effects is the net 
impact on national welfare in the home country.  This is represented, 
in a static framework, in terms of the change in domestic value-added 
resulting from foreign studies and eventual migration.  The associated 
                                                 
6
 There are also certain similarities between the general human capital formation-migration framework and the 
model of Kwok and Leland (1982), but their scenario does not include a brain gain effect. 
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welfare calculation depends, in turn, on the consequences for the home 
country’s level of productivity, as well as the additional social costs 
resulting from eventual educational investments abroad.  It is assumed 
there are no remittances.7 
4) Since foreign studies enhance productivity and thereby potentially lead 
to beneficial welfare effects, public authorities in the home country 
may seek, under certain conditions, to encourage foreign studies by 
subsidizing the candidates through alternative grant schemes, subject 
to a given overall budgetary constraint.8  The welfare implications of 
three alternative grant policies are initially compared under an initial 
assumption that the public authorities have full information regarding 
students’ underlying abilities.  In particular, the impact of 
unconditional grants are compared to conditional grants, wherein 
students have the either the obligation to return to their home country, 
or the option of not doing so, provided their grants are repaid.   
Finally, certain implications of asymmetric information regarding the 
underlying abilities of grant recipients are explored. 
 
II. A. Sub-Model of Individual Investment in Human Capital Formation and 
International Migration  
 
 The initial focus is on the human capital investment decisions, in a first 
period, by heterogeneous individuals, who decide whether to pursue further 
studies at home, or abroad.  Both their specific abilities and where they 
undertake further studies determine prospects for achieving enhanced 
productivity at the end of the period.  Within a two-country setting, 
individuals, who initially choose to study at home, know that their job 
prospects, in a second period, will be confined to a lower-wage domestic 
market.  In contrast, the pursuit of foreign studies offers prospects of higher 
productivity gains due to a conjectured superior quality of the foreign 
educational system.  Individuals face a critical arbitrage, since there is an ex 
                                                 
7
 It is relatively straightforward to modify the proposed modelling framework, in order to allow for remittances, 
which would partially offset the negative welfare effects of brain drain.  While such an extension potentially 
impacts quantitative results, it does not modify the essential qualitative insights summarized in subsequent 
propositions. 
8
 Grants financing studies abroad are widely used, and can often be characterized in terms of the different grant 
categories considered here.  For example, China, Thailand and Singapore offer conditional grants, which, while 
largely attributed in the sciences, require a return period of home country employment.  For many developing 
countries, the associated financial commitments are considerable both in relative and absolute terms.  For instance, 
in the case of Senegal a report of the Coordination of Technical and Financial Partnerships in Education for 
Senegal (2013) indicates that 37% of all higher-education grant aid to students in 2011 was for foreign studies, 
while the associated value of such funding amounted to almost 14.5 million dollars.  In the case of the Republic of 
the Congo, the web journal, “Star du Congo” (April 7, 2014), reported that 32.6% of university-grant applications 
for the 2013-14 academic year were for studying abroad. 
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ante trade-off between improved employment prospects and higher sunk 
costs.  While the pursuit of foreign studies offers higher salaries, individuals 
are initially uncertain regarding whether, or not, they will be subsequently 
hired abroad. 
More specifically, out of an overall population of N individuals in the 
domestic country, N0 represents the number of domestic individuals who 
remain at home for both their education and work, while N* is the total 
number of persons who choose to undertake foreign studies and, 
subsequently, work either at home, or abroad.  Thus, there are two distinct 
sub-populations of N*, corresponding to the phenomena of “brain gain” and 
“brain drain”.  In particular, N1* designates the number of domestic 
individuals who chose to get educated abroad and subsequently work in the 
foreign country, while N1 corresponds to the number of domestic individuals 
who are educated abroad, but then return home to work. In sum, whereas 
higher values of N1* generate greater brain drain, increases in N1 results in 
more brain gain. 
The overall domestic population of N individuals are understood to 
differ in terms of their innate intellectual and work capacities, which for the 
kth individual, can be denoted as ak.  The attainable productivity levels for 
students depend not only on their underlying abilities and the quality of the 
initial educational system in the home country, designated as q1, but also on 
where further educational investments are to be undertaken at home, or 
abroad. In this regard, it is hypothesized that the quality of the domestic 
higher educational system, Q1, is inferior to that offered in the foreign 
country, Q2.  Hence, there is an educational production function that 
determines how investments of fixed amounts of time in a particular 
educational system map individuals’ capacities into their effective 
qualifications or productivity levels, ek, such that  ek=f(ak, q1, Qj), where 
j=1,2.9  This functional relation results in a range of attainable productivity 
levels, measured on a scale between, e0 and e2. For subsequent simplicity, a 
value of e0 is used as a numeraire to designate a unique level of productivity 
for all of the N0 domestically educated workers, regardless of their inherent 
capacities.  However, workers trained abroad, N1* or N1 , enjoy higher final 
productivity levels, which are distributed, according to their innate abilities, 
on an interval from e1 to e2, as represented by a density function, h(e). 
 
                                                 
9
 More generally, the value of the kth individual’s human capital investments depends on the amount of time spent 
on education, the quality of university educational systems and his/her ability.  While the analysis here only 
provides for individuals undertaking higher educational studies in a single period and in only one country, it could 
be extended to allow for students spending different periods of time, either at home or abroad.  The returns from 
educational investments could depend, then, on the specific stage of university, or earlier, studies, as well as 
country-specific differences in educational quality, which could be highly variable according to educational levels. 
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While offering the prospect of higher productivity gains, the decision 
to undertake foreign studies is understood to entail higher educational costs, 
I*, compared to the costs of pursuing further education in the home country, 
I0. Hence, in the absence of educational grants, students will be willing to 
incur this difference between the foreign and domestic educational costs, 
designated as i = I* - I0, provided two conditions are met.  First, the expected 
higher wage returns arising from enhanced productivity gains must offset 
the net cost differential for paying for higher quality studies abroad.  
Second, financial markets are assumed to be perfect.  Accordingly, students 
can readily borrow against their expected future earnings, in order to 
finance the immediate sunk costs of educational investments, inclusive of 
financing charges. 
 
Individuals’ ex ante willingness to incur sunk costs of educational 
investments is clearly impacted by anticipations regarding the labour market 
conditions they face after graduating - both at home and abroad.  The latter 
are reflected both by hiring prospects and wage differentials between the two 
countries.  In the proposed framework, individuals who have been educated 
abroad have the ex post option of seeking employment abroad at a higher 
wage, than in their home market.  For the overall population of N* workers, 
who are educated abroad, each individual, designated by the subscript k, 
faces a probability, pk , of finding qualified employment abroad.  This 
probability plays a crucial role in the analysis, as it delineates “brain drain” 
from “brain gain” effects. Notably, two extreme cases, where pk equals either 
1, or 0, correspond, respectively, to pure brain drain or brain gain effects.  
For more intermediate value of pk , both the phenomena of brain drain and 
brain gain will arise, respectively, in the proportions pk and 1 – pk across the 
overall population N*.  
 
Nonetheless, in the proposed model, the probability of finding 
employment abroad varies across the heterogeneous population of 
individuals, since it depends endogenously on their expected levels of 
productivity, which, in turn, are related to underlying abilities and 
educational choices.  More specifically, each of the pk values is taken to 
depend linearly on the level of the effective qualifications realized by the kth 
individual, ek, relative to a threshold value, E1 , reflecting a minimum 
standard in the foreign labour market, and negatively on the range of skill 
requirements, E2 -  E1, such that: 
 
  (1.)  )E(E
)E(e)p(ep
12
1k
kk
−
−
==  
 
 9
Figure 1 offers a representative illustration of the assumed distribution 
of effective qualification levels for domestic individuals, in relation to the 
skill requirements of the foreign labour market. Intermediate values for the 
parameters E1 and E2 are assumed, where these threshold values, 
respectively, preclude or guarantee foreign market employment.  Thus, in 
the proposed model, each foreign-trained, domestic-origin, student faces a 
non-zero probability of finding employment abroad.  A previously indicated 
simplification is that individuals, who chose to remain at home for their 
education, are unable to work abroad.10 
 
Figure 1 
 
The Assumed Structure of Skill Levels Attainable at Home or Abroad, 
Relative to Foreign Labour Market Requirements 
 
 
 
 
      e0        E1      e1        e2       E2 
 
The parameters, E1 and E2, can be understood to reflect foreign labour 
market conditions, as well as educational and employment policies.  For 
example, employment standards abroad can be influenced by the overall 
quality of the foreign educational system (including that of pre-university 
studies), as well as by technology-driven, labour-demand requirements.  
Different combinations of these parameter values can also be interpreted to 
represent alternative immigration policies, since higher values could 
correspond to more restricted labour market access, while depending on the 
skill intensities of available jobs in the foreign country.  Moreover, lower 
values of E2 could, ceteris paribus, represent a situation of relative shortages 
for specific categories of highly skilled workers.  Furthermore, lower 
(higher) values of both of these foreign market parameters can be 
interpreted as facilitating (hindering) the immigration of foreign skilled 
workers. 
 Following their studies, foreign-trained domestic students have an 
incentive to seek employment abroad due to the higher foreign salaries, w*, 
for skilled jobs, whereas returning students can only earn a lower 
reservation wage in their home country, equal to w1 .11  For tractability, both 
of these salaries are assumed to be unique values, which are independent of 
                                                 
10Eventual rationale for this assumption include an inadequate relative quality, or high-degree of specificity, of the 
domestic educational system, positive professional network effects on employment abroad arising from foreign 
studies, and/or restrictive visa and related immigration policies, favouring students trained in a host country. 
11
  A fixed exchange rate equal to unity is assumed. 
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students’ effective qualification levels achieved through their pursuit of 
studies abroad.  Furthermore, it is assumed that the reservation wage, facing 
returning students, is higher than both the remuneration offered to wholly 
domestically trained workers, w0 , and the foreign wage, which they can earn 
in less skilled jobs abroad, w0*.12  Within this proposed framework, students, 
who are unsuccessful in finding appropriate skilled work in the foreign 
country, will return home.13  While the wage rates are taken to be exogenous, 
the subsequent analysis will consider comparative static changes in their 
values, reflecting the relative attractiveness of labour market conditions 
internationally.  Figure 2 summarizes, then, the overall international 
structure of wages, depending on job locations and educational backgrounds   
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The Structure of International Wages According to Job Location 
and Educational Background 
 
 
 
                w0      w0*     w1           w* 
 
 
 The ex ante, optimal educational choice, for the representative kth 
student involves a trade-off, which can be formulated in terms of an 
arbitrage condition.  Specifically, the net returns from studying and working 
at home, with lower overall effective qualifications, need to be compared to 
expected higher wage earnings, arising from enhanced productivity due to 
foreign studies, albeit at a greater investment cost.  The expected wage 
remuneration involves a probability-weighted average of wages for more 
skilled workers in the foreign and domestic markets. Accordingly, a 
representative student will decide to study in the foreign country if: 
 
                                                 
12
 This feature of the model could be modified to allow for an analysis of issues relating to brain waste, were w0* 
to be higher than w1. 
13
  Of course, other factors, such as cultural affinities, as well as personal and family considerations, could offset 
the locational incentives of these ex post wage differentials between the two countries.  Such additional factors 
generate an additional ex post self-selection problem, which can be modeled in terms of agent-specific 
complementary or substitutable assets and associated sunk costs.  These considerations amplify the degree of 
heterogeneity characterizing individuals’ decisions, thereby accounting for distinctive evolutionary sub-
populations of agents, following, in this instance, the revelation of news regarding job offers.  For example, ceteris 
paribus, if students have a preference to return home, there will be an increase in brain gain effects, relative to 
those identified in the subsequent analysis.  Analogously, when foreign students marry persons from a host 
country, they may be prepared to stay abroad even without optimal employment conditions, thereby forming part 
of brain waste.  
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  (2.)  001kk I wI*)wp(1*wp −>−−+  
 
Hence, the kth individual will decide to study abroad if his/her individual 
probability of being hired abroad, pk is higher than a critical probability 
value, p .  This probability is assumed to depend on a student’s, potentially 
private, information regarding his/her future productivity level, ek .  More 
specifically, the interrelation between this critical probability value, p , and 
the prevailing international wage rates and educational costs are given by:
 
 
  (3.)  
1
01
-w*w
)w-(w-i
 p=  if 
1
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p = 0              if 
1
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From (1.), it follows that the productivity level corresponding to p  is:
112 Ep)E(Ee~ +−=   However,  e~ does not necessarily belong to the segment 
of productivity levels attainable from foreign studies, [e1 , e2 ], so that the 
actual productivity threshold is e  such that 
 
(4.)    e  = 112 Ep)E(Ee~ +−=     if ∈ e~ [e1 , e2 ], 
   e  = e1                                if   e~ <  e1, 
   e  = e2                                if    e~ > e2. 
 
The foregoing specifications permit a characterization of the 
distinctive populations of students, depending on both ex ante educational 
choices and the ex post employment prospects.  In particular, out of the 
overall population of N students, the number of students choosing to remain 
at home is given by deh(e)NN
1e
0 ∫=
e
, whereas the complementary set of 
individuals studying abroad amounts to deh(e)NN-N
2
e
0 ∫=
e
. The latter group 
can be sub-divided into two sets of individuals, corresponding to brain drain 
and brain gain effects, represented, respectively, by N1* = dep(e)h(e)N
2e
e
∫  and 
N1 = [ ]h(e)de p(e)1N
2e
e
∫ − .  Whereas the foregoing analysis assumes exogeneous 
wages, an analogous decomposition of the overall population of students also 
applies where salaries depend positively on productivity levels.  Provided the 
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salary differential between the two markets, w*(e) – w1(e), is a non-
decreasing function of productivity, the expected wage returns from opting 
to study abroad remain an increasing function of e.  Consequently, there also 
exists a threshold level e  determining whether, or not, individuals will 
undertake foreign studies.  As a result, the subsequently reported findings in 
this section are robust to such an alternative formulation.14  
 
Production, or value-added at home is taken to be characterized by a 
linear function, reflecting a proportional relation to productivity. Thus, if 
individuals were not able to study abroad, national output would be Y0 = e0 
N, which constitutes an essential benchmark under educational autarchy, 
since then workers are only trained domestically. The contribution to 
national production generated by the foreign-educated individuals returning 
home corresponds, then, to Y1 = N [ ]h(e)de p(e)1e
2e
e
∫ − .  Hence, Y1 – e0 N1 
constitutes the incremental increase in national income resulting from brain 
gain. 
 
 
II. B. Economic Welfare in the Home Country 
 
The evaluation of brain drain/brain gain effects in the existing 
literature is based on assessments of the impact of migration on a variety of 
specific economic objectives, which, however, do not include an explicit 
social welfare function.  Notably, migration is shown to influence the growth 
rate of the home economy, as in Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001), the 
average educational level, as highlighted by Stark et al. (1997, 1998) and 
Lien and Wang (2005), average productivity in Mountford (1997), as well as 
the wages of non-migrants in Stark (2004).15 
 
A distinctive feature of the proposed analysis is the explicit 
consideration of how brain drain and brain gain effects, linked to 
international human capital formation, impact domestic social welfare, 
relative to the level under autarchy, Y0.  In this perspective, changes in 
welfare generated by international educational and employment mobility 
can be viewed in terms of a cost-benefit analysis relating to changes in 
                                                 
14
 Nonetheless, the exogeneity assumption invoked here, regarding wages and abilities, considerably enhances the 
tractability of mathematical derivations.  
1While an extensive number of empirical studies have assessed different dimensions of the potential impact of 
brain drain and gain, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the size of conjectured positive effects of 
migration upon levels of education, welfare and/or growth.   Notably, Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001, 2008) 
find that the proportion of migrants must be low for such effects to be apparent.  According to Schiff (2006), 
preliminary studies by the World Bank show no positive impact, while Groizard and Llull (2006) indicate a 
similar finding. 
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national aggregate productivity and the net costs of educational expenditures 
borne by the home country.  Nonetheless, such a focus will abstract from 
potential distributional issues concerning relative returns in terms of wages, 
firms’ profits, as well as transfers between the domestic government and the 
private sector.  
 
The net return in terms of productivity generated by a student 
returning home amounts to e – e0, while the net opportunity cost of that 
person’s education equals I*- c, where c corresponds to the social cost of 
educating an individual domestically.  For the case of a student remaining 
abroad, the corresponding effects involve a loss of national productivity, e0 , 
minus a gain amounting to c, since there is no need to incur domestic 
educational costs.  In this regard, it should be noted that future salary gains 
are used to pay off the costs of a foreign education, I*, so that there is no 
associated social cost at home.  In sum, the net cost-benefit evaluation for the 
brain gain resulting from a  representative student returning home amounts 
to e – e0 – (I* - c), whereas, for an individual entailing a brain drain effect, 
the corresponding value equals - (e0 – c).16 
 
More explicitly, the overall change in domestic welfare is determined 
by the brain drain and gain effects corresponding to individuals who study 
abroad, whose productivity levels are comprised between e  and e2. This 
amounts to a variation in social welfare equal to: 
(5.)  ∆W = deh(e))cp(e)(e-]c)*(Iee][p(e)1[N
2
00∫ −−−−−
e
e
 
 
This can be expressed equivalently as :   
               ∆W = deh(e)c)(eI*)p(e)](e[1N
2
0∫ −−−−
e
e
 
As a simplification, the subsequent analysis will assume an uniform 
distribution of attainable productivity levels, comprised between lower and 
higher bounds of e1 and e2.  In light of such a specification, the overall net 
change in welfare becomes: 
(6.)  ∆W = ∫
−
2
12 ee
N e
e
ϕ (e) de = 
12
2
ee
)eΦ()Φ(eN
−
−
 
                                                 
16The educational costs for society of training students, prior to their deciding to study abroad and, subsequently, 
working permanently there, could also, arguably, be considered to negatively impact domestic social welfare.  
There would then be an additional term, negatively impacting domestic welfare, as a result of brain drain.  On the 
other hand, the proposed specification of the social welfare function does not allow for the positive impact of 
remittances, which would depend on the value of w*, along with different propensities characterizing individuals’ 
decisions to transfer funds back home.  Incorporating such effects entails relatively straightforward extensions of 
the basic modelling framework proposed here. 
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Here, the function ϕ constitutes the overall net welfare effect for each  
attainable productivity level.  When the overall social opportunity cost for a 
student who ultimately works abroad is identified as δ = e0 - c, then, in light 
of equation (1.), the expression for ϕ equals: 
 
ϕ(e) = δI*)(e
E-E
e-E
12
2
−− , while Φ in equation (6.) represents the primitive of 
the function ϕ. 
As shown by equation (6.), the incremental change in domestic welfare 
is a function of all the parameters of the model.  To summarize, it depends 
on: 
_ e0:  the productivity of less-skilled domestically-trained workers; 
_ e1 and e2: the two extreme values defining the range of enhanced 
productivity levels for foreign-educated workers; 
_ E1 and E2: parameters reflecting foreign market skill requirements 
and labour market access conditions, which impact the probability of 
finding work abroad; 
_ e : the threshold value of productivity, which decides whether an 
individual chooses to study abroad, which, in turn, is impacted by 
among other factors, the wages of skilled workers employed abroad,     
w*, those for skilled workers employed at home, w1 , and the wages of 
unskilled workers at home, w0 ;17 
_ I*: the cost of foreign studies; 
_ I0 and c: the cost of studies at home per student, borne, respectively, 
by each individual and by society. 
 
The expression for the primitive function in equation (6.), Φ , which 
critically defines the extent of the change in domestic welfare, is of the third 
degree in e.  The underlying reason for such a functional form is the second 
degree form for the integrand, ϕ(e), in equation (6.), which represents the 
expected increase in net welfare for a representative individual.  This 
expression involves a trade-off between the expected increase in productivity 
realized through brain gain, e(1-p(e)) – e0 , and the expected net social cost of 
educating a student abroad, (1-p(e))I*– c.   Since the former quadratic term 
in e assumes low values for either relatively low or high productivity values, 
the values of the integrand are initially negative, then positive (for 
sufficiently low i) and finally negative, as representative productivity levels 
for different individuals increase.  
 
                                                 
17
 As shown by considering equations 3 and 4. 
 15
As illustrated in Figure 3, the general form of the primitive function 
Φ may first show a minimum, for e = 1eˆ , and then a maximum for e = 2eˆ .  Of 
course, these extrema exist if and only if the equation ϕ(e) = 0 admits real 
roots, which corresponds to the following condition: 
 
(7.)						 < ∗

 . 
 
When I* and , which jointly determine the social cost of a foreign 
education, are too high, Φ is always a decreasing function of e.  
Consequently, the change in domestic welfare,  ∆W, is always negative, so 
that the brain drain effect dominates that of brain gain.  The value for which 
Φ has a minimum, 1eˆ  , is relevant only if the latter is greater than E1. 
Calculations show that the associated condition is simply: 
 
(8.)  E1< I*+ 	. 
 
In the rest of the paper, it is assumed that conditions (7.) and (8.) are always 
satisfied. 
 
It should also be noted that the integrand ϕ has a maximum.  
Specifically, the function ϕ takes on  low values when e is itself low, since in 
that case the individual productivity gains are too weak to compensate for 
the cost of foreign studies.  For high values of e, when few students come 
back home, there is a loss of productivity for society as a whole, so the value 
of ϕ is also low.   This maximum occurs for e = (E2 + I*)/2,  which 
corresponds to an inflection point for the curve representing function 
Φ, such that the marginal increase in social welfare associated with a 
marginal decrease of the productivity threshold  is the highest. 
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Figure 3 
 
Representation of the Functional Form for the Primitive Function, Φ,  which 
Determines the Overall Change in Domestic Welfare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section III:  An Analysis of the Effects on Economic Welfare of Changes in 
Key Model Parameters  
 
III.1 The Interrelation between Threshold Productivity Levels and Changes 
in Welfare 
 
 
The initial focus here is on the welfare implications of the critical value 
of e , which reflects the threshold productivity level for which a 
representative individual chooses to study abroad. The value of e in relation 
to 2eˆ  is potentially of key importance. Note again that e  is a function of the 
critical threshold probability, p , triggering foreign study, as well as of the 
foreign labour market productivity requirements, E1 and E2 , since 
112 Ep)E(Ee +−= .  In turn, 2eˆ  is a function of E1, E2 , and the social 
opportunity cost of foreign studies, δ.  Hence, it follows that e > 2eˆ  for p > plim, 
where plim = 
12
12
EE
Eeˆ
−
−
 .  Furthermore, 2eˆ < E2 , since ϕ(Ε2) < 0,  so that the value 
of plim is always inferior to one; while it could be negative, this would mean 
that E1> ê2 . However, this corresponds to a relatively uninteresting case, 
 
Φ 
e 
e 
 
e 
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where domestic welfare always declines, as a result no individuals study 
abroad. For more relevant scenarios, there is an actual probability threshold 
beyond which e > 2eˆ . It can also easily be seen that when e  increases and e2  
> ê1 , ∆W has a maximum for e  = ê1. Thus, if initially e < ê1 , a marginal 
increase in e promotes welfare.  However, if e > ê1, an increase in e reduces 
the number of people who study abroad, thereby reducing welfare.  An 
examination of Figure 3 and a comparison of the values taken by the 
function Φ for e and e2, leads then to the following: 
 
Proposition 1 
 
When the threshold productivity level,e , determining whether individuals 
will study abroad, and the upper limit on the associated level of enhanced 
productivity, e2, both belong to the interval [ 1eˆ , 2eˆ ], the change in welfare 
resulting from studying abroad, ∆W, is positive.  Hence, the welfare 
improvement from brain gain dominates the loss due to brain drain. 
In contrast, there are three cases where foreign studies generate a loss of 
welfare.  Notably, 
a) when e and e2  are both very low, the return to foreign education, in 
terms of increased productivity, is weak and does not compensate for its 
social costs, even if many individuals study abroad and return home to 
work ; 
b) when e and e2 are both very high, few individuals leave to study abroad, 
but most of these will readily find a job abroad, resulting in a dominance 
of the brain drain effect; 
c) when e is low and e2 is high, there is an accumulation of the foregoing 
      effects a) and b).  Notably, many individuals study abroad, thereby 
      generating high additional educational investment costs, but 
      only those with lower-productivity gains return home.      
 
In sum, the welfare implications of comparative static changes in 
productivity levels, e and e2 , are inherently ambiguous. 
 
  
III.2  The Configuration of Wages and Associated Welfare Effects 
 
The influence of wages on domestic welfare works through changes in 
the critical values for p  and e . As can be expected, higher wages for 
domestically trained workers create, ceteris paribus, a disincentive to 
studying abroad, so when w0 increases, both p  and e  increase.  However, 
when the potential job market returns to foreign studies w* or w1 increase, 
the incentives to studying abroad are increased, so that p  and e
 
are 
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lowered.  The associated consequences for domestic welfare stem from the 
preceding analysis of the influence of e .  Specifically, if e
 
is not very low 
(inferior to ê1), an increase (decrease) in wages for foreign-trained (domestic-
trained) workers, decreases (increases) e , thereby enhancing welfare. 
 
III.3  Welfare Implications of Changes in the Relative Productivity Gains 
from Education at Home and Abroad 
 
A heightened efficiency for domestically-trained workers, e0, which 
corresponds to an improved domestic educational system, reduces the net 
impact on welfare of brain drain and brain gain, by increasing the 
opportunity cost of undertaking foreign studies.  In contrast, an increase in 
the lower limit of the enhanced efficiency level attained via foreign studies, 
e1, raises the returns to a foreign education, and induces a larger proportion 
of the population to study abroad. The effect of a variation in e2 is more 
complex to assess.  By widening the span of productivity values, an increase 
of e2, ceteris paribus, has a negative influence upon ∆W. If e2>ê2 , Φ(e2) also 
decreases, so that the overall effect is also negative.  However, if e2 belongs to 
the interval [ê1 , ê2] , Φ(e2) increases and the net effect is indeterminate.  
More specifically, the formula for the derivative of ∆W is: 
 
(9.)
2de
Wd∆
= 2
12 )e(e
N
−
{Φ( e ) –[Φ(e2) – (e2 –e1 ) ϕ(e2)]} . 
 
It can be seen that, if e < ê2 , so that ∆W may be positive, then the foregoing 
expression is negative for e2 = ê2 .  Consequently, the change in the domestic 
country’s welfare has a maximum for some value of e2 (also inferior to ê2).  
In light of the foregoing analysis, the following holds: 
 
Proposition 2 
 
The change in the domestic country’s welfare, ∆W, is an increasing 
function of the level of e2 , the maximal level of enhanced productivity 
achievable by undertaking studies abroad, provided e2 remains under a critical 
level. Beyond this threshold, ∆W decreases with e2 .  Thus, too much of an 
improvement in human capital, or, alternatively, relative excellence in the 
foreign institutions, generates a dominant effect of brain drain.  
The associated critical value of e2 is increasing with the threshold 
productivity level determining whether students go abroad, e , and decreasing 
with the lower limit of the value of enhanced productivity, e1 . 
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Finally, if both e1 and e2 increase with a constant span between the two 
values, ∆W has a maximum for e2 = ê2.  Such a change could result from 
improvements in the quality of individuals’ initial education in the home 
country and/or in higher educational standards abroad.  In that case, from 
the perspective of domestic welfare, there is also an optimal level of relative 
efficiency in the foreign educative system. Any increase of foreign 
educational efficiency above this level will diminish home national welfare, 
thereby constituting a form of “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy.   
 
III.4  Changes in the Sunk Cost Differential for Studying Abroad 
 
As the additional sunk costs associated with foreign studies, i, increase, 
the threshold probability of finding a job abroad increases, as does the 
corresponding threshold productivity level, e .  Furthermore, if this increase 
in i comes from an increase in I*, the integrand function ϕ decreases.  As a 
consequence, so long as ∈ e  [ê1 , ê2], an increase in the incremental costs of 
studies abroad, i, reduces the home country’s welfare. In contrast, for low 
values of e ( e < ê1), an increase in i could possibly be beneficial.  In such a 
scenario there is initially an excessive flight of students abroad, since, for a 
representative student, the productivity gains from a foreign education are 
high, whereas the additional costs, i, are low. 
 
 
III.5 Alternative Immigrant Employment Policies in the Foreign Country 
 
The relative ease of access to the foreign labour market is captured 
here by alternative values for the labour market requirement parameters, E1 
and E2.  Ceteris paribus, for higher values of either parameter it is more 
difficult for a domestic-origin, but foreign-trained, job-searcher with a given 
qualification level to be employed abroad.  More specifically, when either E1, 
or E2 increase, e  increases, but p(ek) decreases for any value of ek .  
Crucially, there are two offsetting effects.  On the one hand, fewer 
individuals leave to become educated abroad, but, on the other hand, a 
greater fraction of graduated students come back home.  Thus, the total pool 
of foreign trained students from the domestic country is reduced.  This 
means that the overall exposure of the domestic country to welfare changes, 
arising from either brain drain or brain gain, decreases.  However, the 
relative proportion of foreign-trained students generating a brain gain 
increases as a result of the more restrictive job filtering environment in the 
foreign country.  Consequently, the net effect on domestic welfare is 
potentially ambiguous. 
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 As demonstrated in Appendix 1, the following summary conclusion 
applies: 
 
Proposition 3 
 
Restrictions limiting entry by foreign-trained students to the host 
country’s labour market increase home national welfare, provided the 
following conditions hold: 
a.  the cost of undertaking foreign studies is high;  
b.  the maximum achievable productivity level, e2, is relatively low; and 
c.  relatively few individuals undertake studies abroad 
(i.e. p
 
is near 1). 
In contrast, if the foregoing conditions are not satisfied, then less favourable 
foreign labour market conditions result in a negative impact on domestic 
welfare. 
 
 
Section IV:  A Comparative Analysis of the Domestic Welfare Implications 
of Alternative Educational Grant Schemes 
 
The focus in this section is on the optimal design of educational grants, 
aimed at enhancing a domestic country’s welfare by facilitating foreign 
study for different categories of students.  Since alternative subsidy 
programs can change the incentives to study abroad, they potentially impact 
the balance between brain drain and brain gain, which, in turn, determines 
the net changes in domestic welfare. 
 
Two distinct analytical exercises are proposed depending on 
contrasting scenarios regarding the extent of a government’s knowledge of 
students’ underlying abilities.  Initially, it will be assumed that both the 
government and students themselves have perfect information regarding 
individuals’ abilities.  In a second scenario, it is assumed instead that the 
government, unlike the students themselves, has no knowledge regarding 
individuals’ capabilities. 
 
In the first scenario of perfect information the government can 
discriminate ex ante between individuals when allocating grants according to 
three different grant schemes.18  The first of these entails unconditional 
grants (designated as UC), which are awarded without any constraints on 
students regarding either financial repayments, or subsequent employment 
                                                 
18
 For simplicity, the analysis here will focus on grants entailing uniform payments for all recipients, rather than 
discriminating between individuals in terms of the proposed value of the grants.  
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choices.  Under a second scheme, labeled as optional return (OR), any grant 
recipient may opt to work in the foreign country, but must then pay back the 
full value of the grant.  Finally, under a third scheme, identified as 
compulsory return (CR),  students commit to returning home to work, even 
if they could otherwise have been employed abroad at a higher wage. 
 
 
IV.1 Unconditional Grants   
 
When an omniscient government has full information regarding the 
underlying ability of all students, grants will be allocated as a function of a 
candidate’s ability, or, equivalently, in light of the associated expected 
productivity gain.  Of course, individuals whose productivity is superior to 
the standard threshold  will never be grant beneficiaries, since there is no 
need for any additional financial incentive to undertake foreign studies.  
Under this system, all individuals, whose productivity levels are comprised 
between a designated level, , and , may be candidates for a grant.  The 
lower productivity limit for the grant recipients, , is endogenously 
determined by the per capita value of the foreign educational subsidies, S.  
This amount also depends, in turn, on the government’s overall educational 
budget constraint.  Nonetheless, it is not necessarily optimal to give a grant 
to the brightest students (whose productivity is relatively close to the 
threshold value of ), since such students are less likely to return home to 
work.  Hence, grants will be given, a priori, to students whose productivity 
belongs to a certain segment of productivity values, , , with  ≤  . 
 
The new productivity threshold, , is determined by an ex ante, 
individual arbitrage condition such that: 
 
(10.)     ∗ +  − 
 − ∗ − 
 =  −   
 
where  = 
 indicates the threshold probability for grant beneficiaries. 
Then, there is a standard interrelation between such a probability value and 
the associated threshold productivity level, , such that: =(E2 – E1)+ E1.  
It is straightforward to see that, 
(10.)  	 −  = ∗ 
so that,  
 
(12.)		 −  = 
∗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As a result, for any given proposed values for the individual foreign 
study grants, as well as an overall budget for the government grant program, 
the subset of students actually going abroad is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Structure of the population for unconditional grants 
 
          (1)       (2)      (3)       (4) 
 
 
       e1                                        e2        
 
zone 1 corresponds to individuals for whom the proposed grant is not 
sufficient to convince them to go abroad 
zone 2 corresponds to grant recipients who undertake foreign studies due to 
the grant 
zone 3 corresponds to individuals who do not receive a grant and study at 
home 
zone 4 corresponds to individuals, who while not receiving any grant, still 
undertake foreign studies 
 
 
Now let F be the overall budget allocated for grants. The number of 
beneficiaries will be ! "		, where " = 	  −	 corresponds to the 
productivity interval of grant recipients.  Hence, the government budget 
constraint may be written ! "		 = #, or, equivalently, in light of equation 
(12.), 
 
(13.)  ( −  
 −  
 = $# 
 
where k = ∗

!  . 
 
Under this scheme, the increase of welfare generated by allowing 
additional individuals to study abroad is: 
 
(14.)  %& = '(( ) *(
	+(

  
 
The maximum value of ∆Wb is reached for values of  and , such that 
≥
 ê1 and ≤ê2 .   This corresponds to an upper sloping segment of the 
e 
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primitive function, Φ, which determines the overall change in domestic 
welfare, as depicted in Figure 3.  Otherwise, were  to be inferior to ê1, it 
would be possible to increase %&, for a given , by increasing , while 
still reducing the educational budgetary expenditures.  Analogously, if   
were to be superior to ê2, it would be possible to increase %& by decreasing  with  constant, while reducing again budgetary expenditures.  
Nonetheless, a maximum value for %& with  = ê2 may not be feasible 
since, by construction, it must be the case that ≤. 
 
If it is assumed that e ≥  ê2, then  can reach ê2, which is its 
unconstrained optimal value. Provided the level of available funds permits 
such a value for  and , the optimum will then be  = ê2 and  = ê1, that 
is if  − 
 ( − 
 ≤ $# . If the available public funds are relatively low, 
the budgetary constraint will be binding and the optimum value of  will be 
inferior to .  Yet, in any case the optimal value of  will be strictly inferior 
to .  
 
Instead, if it is assumed that 		< ê2, the constraint  ≤	 may become 
binding.  The optimum then corresponds to  =  and = 	, conditional 
on the level of funds being large enough, as expressed by the constraint 
$# ≥  − 
.  However, it is shown in Appendix 2 that, provided that the 
budgetary constraint is binding, there exists a threshold productivity value, 
-./, and associated intervals of values for  and F, where, respectively, (	0	(123	, ( and 4	 ∈ 4, 4, such that %& has a maximum for some 
value of	, where the corresponding  is inferior to .  When these 
conditions are not satisfied, %& is always an increasing function of .  
Since  is always inferior or equal to , the optimum is associated with the 
maximum value for , which corresponds to  = , and is given by 
 =  − √$#.  This means that the segment of productivity values ,  is 
fully covered by the allocation of the grants, while the value of  depends on 
the level of the available funds. 
 
The foregoing analysis can be summarized, as follows: 
 
Proposition 4 
 
When a government has full knowledge regarding students’ abilities, a 
scheme of unconditional grants (UC), which targets individuals who are not 
among the most qualified (relative to ), can be optimal under specific 
conditions.  
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In particular, the welfare effects of such unrestricted grants are more 
favourable when either of the following combination of productivity and 
budgetary conditions apply:  i.  > , or ii. 	8	-./	,  and #	 ∈ #, #. 
 
Thus, the foregoing proposition highlights an apparent paradox in the 
funding of unconditional grants for studies abroad, which are aimed at 
promoting national welfare. Specifically, in the presence of potential brain 
drain due to more attractive working conditions abroad, it may, somewhat 
paradoxically, be preferable to offer grants to somewhat less qualified 
individuals in an interval of potential productivity levels lying between  
and .  The existence of such threshold levels is analogous to a phenomenon 
often encountered in the optimal design of public subsidies.  These can entail 
boundary conditions for subsets of the population, ranked in terms of 
income. 
 
IV.2 Conditional Grants  
 
As previously indicated, two systems of conditional grants are 
envisaged.  These correspond to the cases of either optional (OR) or 
compulsory return (CR) to work in the home country. 
 
A. The Case of Optional Return 
 
In this scenario a student, after graduation, will either find a job 
abroad and reimburse the educational grant money, or decide to return 
home.  Under such a scheme, the net expected income of a student who 
receives a conditional grant, amounting to 9:, but with an optional return 
is: 

∗ − 9: +  − 
 − ∗ − 9:
 = 
∗ +  − 
 − ∗ +  − 
9: 
 
In light of the last term in this expression, it follows that the net expected 
gain for such a grant recipient is always superior to the expected income 
without a grant, regardless of a student’s productivity. 
 
As a consequence, the overall pool of grant beneficiaries will be defined 
by a productivity threshold level, 9:, which is inferior to the standard 
threshold  , and where  and 9: are, respectively, defined by: 
 
  (15.)      
∗ +  − 
 − ∗ =  −   
 
 
;. 
				9:
∗ − 9: +  − 9:
 − ∗ − 9:
 =  −   
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 By comparing equations (15.) and (16.), it can be seen that: 
 
=. 
    9: = ∗ − 
 
 − 9:
 − 9:
 = 
∗ − 
  − 9: − 9: 
Note that the inequality  9: < ∗ −  always holds.  As a consequence, if a 
student, who has accepted the grant, is proposed a foreign job, that 
individual will always accept it rather than return home.  The grant will be 
given to students whose productivity levels are comprised between 9: and >9:.  Since for each productivity value e, only a proportion of  − 
 
students come back, the budgetary constraint is given by: 
?. 
 ! −  @9:9: = # 
where 
         A. 
 @9: = B  − 
 C
D9:
9:
 
By combining (17.), (18.) and (19.), this constraint becomes: 
 ( − 9:
E − 9: B  − 
C = $#
>9:
9:
 
 
The change in social welfare corresponds then to: 
 
 . 
 F&9: = ! −  B  G
 C
9:
9:
 
 
 
 
B. The Case of Compulsory Return 
 
Here, a grant recipient is obliged, following studies abroad, to return 
home and work in the domestic labor market.  Two conditions must be met 
for a representative student k to accept such a grant, which amounts to H:. 
First, the earnings from returning to work at home, following studies 
abroad, must be superior to those associated with staying at home to both 
study and work.  Hence, this condition corresponds to: 
 
 − ∗ − H:
  ≥  −   
 
Second, the expected net returns must also be superior to those for an 
individual, who chooses to study abroad without accepting such a grant with 
a compulsory return home: 
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																															 − ∗ + H: ≥ I$
∗ +  − $
 − ∗ 
 
This condition leads to (J ≤ (K, where the threshold (K is an increasing 
function of LMN.  It follows that (K = (, when LMN = O∗ − O − P −P 
, 
which is the minimum value, such that the proposed grant would be 
accepted.  For higher values of LMN, the upper productivity limit (K will be 
superior to (.  Certain of these higher-ability students may opt to accept the 
grant, despite the binding commitment to return home, since they may 
prefer not to have to pay by themselves the full cost of foreign studies.  Thus, 
in this instance there is a key analytic issue of whether it is preferable for the 
public authorities to offer grants exclusively to students who would not leave 
without a grant (i.e. whose productivity levels are lower than ), or to also 
propose grants for brighter students, who would study abroad even in the 
absence of government subsidies.19 
 
In the first sub-case of grants for less able students, the productivity 
interval, characterizing the recipients, spans an interval of length QRS =	 −H: , so that the budgetary constraint becomes: 
 
                           (21.) TUVUW QRSH: = X 
 
Clearly, for a given amount of the grant, H:, this constraint determines the 
range of grant recipients, QRS. The incremental welfare generated by such 
grants is specified then by: 
. 
																										F&H: = ! − B  − Y
	C

H:
 
where A is the total social cost of sending a student abroad, such that 
Y = ∗ +  . 
 
For the second sub-case, as shown in Appendix 3, it is optimal to give 
grants first to the brightest students, whose productivity goes by descending 
order from e2 to , where  ≥ .  Yet, if the budgetary constraint is not 
binding, educational support will also be offered to less talented students, 
whose productivity levels lie between  and .  Here, the amount of the 
grant is determined by the value of e2:  H:Z = 
∗ −
, while the 
budget constraint then amounts to: 
                          (23.)                      ! "H:Z H:′ = # 
 
                                                 
19
 A potentially worthwhile extension of the analysis would be to consider the role of inter-temporal constraints on 
educational investment decisions.  Income inequality can then play a critical role in influencing what subsets of 
students will chose to study abroad, when there are associated higher educational costs.    
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where  "H:Z =  − 
+ −
. 
 
The additional welfare generated by such a grant scheme, includes a sub-
component corresponding to students whose productivity levels are such that 
 ≥ .  The net welfare improvement for each of these students amounts to 
 − Y − G
 = 
 − ∗
, so that total incremental change in welfare is 
specified by:  
 
                         (24) 	F&H:Z = ! )  − Y
	C

\ +
!
 ) 
− ∗
	C\  
 
A priori, it is difficult to assert for which of these sub-cases the largest 
welfare improvements, F&H: or F&H:Z , arise.  Nonetheless, when either the 
social opportunity cost of foreign studies, A, is high enough, or when  is 
relatively low, then F&H: is constrained to be rather small.  This is reflected 
by the expression for the change of welfare in equation (22.).  Hence, it is 
better to start such a grant scheme by proposing financing to the brightest 
students.  
 
The analysis will now turn to a more detailed comparison of the welfare 
gains potentially generated by each of the three overall grant systems. 
 
IV.3 A Comparative Welfare Analysis for Different Grant Schemes 
 
An initial comparison will be made between the welfare implications of 
unconditional grants and conditional grants, where in the latter instance 
returning to work in the home labor market is optional.  As a partial 
simplification, this analysis will be limited to scenarios where the 
productivity levels		  and 	are comprised between 	and .  Such a 
restriction avoids additional complications, which can arise when studying 
abroad without grants does not always generate enhanced social welfare.  A 
principal finding can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 5 
 
For the same overall budget, conditional grants with an optional return (OR) 
always generate greater increases in social welfare, relative to unconditional 
grants (UC), so that OR > UC. 
 
The associated proof is provided in Appendix 4.1 . 
 
The extension of this comparative analysis of grants schemes, to 
consider a scenario where returning home is compulsory (designated by CR), 
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entails further complications.  As previously demonstrated in Section IV.2.B, 
there are two different expressions for the welfare benefits of such grants.  
However, for analytical simplicity the analysis here will be confined to a 
consideration of the limiting cases where the level of public funding for such 
grants with compulsory return is either very small, or very large.  In these 
cases, it can be shown that:  
 
Proposition 6 
 
a) When available funds are very small, the system of grants with optional 
return results in the greatest improvement in national welfare, while 
conditional returns constitute the least favorable scheme.  Accordingly, the 
national social preference ranking for the three schemes can be summarized by 
the following inequalities:  OR > UC > CR.  
 
b) In contrast, when available funds are very large, the system of grants with 
compulsory return is preferable to the other two schemes, so that:   CR > OR > 
UC. 
 
The associated proof is provided in Appendix 4.2. 
 
 
 
IV.4  Grants under Asymmetric Information 
 
 The analysis will now consider implications of imperfect knowledge 
regarding individuals’ abilities for assessing the optimality of different grant 
schemes.  In an extreme scenario, where the government does not have any 
information regarding students’ innate abilities, the welfare impact of public 
authorities awarding uniform grants for foreign studies can be explored.  
The same individual monetary subsidies are granted to a proportion of the 
overall population, independently of students’ abilities.  When the 
government faces a specific educational budget constraint, it can be 
demonstrated that welfare will always increase, provided the modelling 
parameters are such that the analysis applies to the upward sloping segment 
of the primitive function, Φ.  However, for certain other parameter values 
welfare may actually decrease.  Furthermore, for 221 eˆeeeˆ <<< , the optimal 
proportion of the population, α, which should receive such awards in order 
to enhance welfare, equals 1.   Hence, the overall grant budget is divided 
evenly across the entire population. 
 
More generally, an apparent limitation of any grant scheme with 
imperfect information is that individuals with potential productivity levels 
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above the threshold value of  will receive subsidies which constitute a 
deadweight social loss, since they would have studied abroad anyway in the 
absence of such financing.  This reasoning can be extended to consider the 
welfare implications of such grants resulting from comparative static 
changes in the overall quality of the basic educational system in the home 
country, q1 .  When the initial educational system is of a higher quality, the 
interval between e1 and e2 shifts to the right, so that the relative position of 
the threshold level  is lowered within that segment of productivity values.  
Accordingly, as information becomes more imperfect, educational grants 
generate heightened social welfare inefficiencies.  This potentially 
immiserizing feature of educational grants under uncertainty can also be 
formulated as follows:  
 
Proposition 7 
 
When public authorities do not have any information regarding students’ 
abilities, and an unconditional grant scheme for foreign studies increases 
domestic welfare, the extent of such a welfare improvement is inversely related 
to the quality of a home country’s initial educational system, q1 .   
 
Such a lessened efficacy of unconditional grants is due to a greater 
deadweight social loss, since educational improvements lead to a relatively 
higher proportion of grant recipients, who would have studying abroad 
anyway in the absence of such grants.  This effect aggravates potential 
inefficiencies generated by asymmetric information.  Thus, under such 
informational conditions a home country faces an apparent trade-off 
between enhancing its economic welfare via improvements in initial levels of 
educational attainment and through grant schemes aimed at offering 
incentives to study abroad.  Consequently, the extent to which information is 
incomplete can condition the optimal design of grant schemes, depending on 
countries’ standards of living and the quality of their educational systems.       
 
Asymmetric information has apparent implications for the earlier 
identified paradox characterizing the optimal design of unconditional grants, 
which were proposed for sub-portions of the population, who are not 
necessarily among the most qualified.  Now, it is no longer feasible to 
distinguish students according to their abilities.  This analysis can also be 
extended to consider optional return grants under incomplete information.  
Specifically, when there are imperfections in the extent to which public 
authorities can identify individuals’ abilities, there is potentially an incentive 
for students to distort their performance, in order to qualify for grants.  
Such incentive compatibility issues need to be taken into consideration when 
formulating optimal grant policies.  Unlike unconditional and optional 
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return grant schemes, grants entailing a compulsory return effectively 
eliminate such strategic distortions.  This is due to an auto-selection process, 
whereby only those candidates, whose anticipated net earnings will increase, 
accept such grants, thereby revealing their true abilities.  Furthermore, with 
reference to Proposition 6b), it can be shown for the case of uniform grants 
that imperfect information results in an expanded set of instances where 
grants with compulsory returns dominate unconditional and optional return 
grants. 
 
Section V:  Conclusion  
 
 
A distinctive goal of this research has been the formulation of a micro-
founded heterogeneous-agent model of international migration and 
educational choice, thereby highlighting critical roles for self-selection 
mechanisms and informational asymmetries.  Distinctive features of the 
analysis arise from the endogenous determination of human capital 
investment decisions and foreign employment prospects, which differ across 
individuals according to their abilities.  This structure provides a framework 
for understanding the interrelation between international educational 
choices and employment prospects, along with aggregate assessments of the 
domestic welfare implications of brain drain and brain gain.  Heterogeneity 
and associated informational issues also condition the optimal design of 
alternative educational grant schemes, aimed at increasing a source 
country’s well-being.   
 
Certain more specific insights from this research can be summarized, 
as follows.  Crucially, the net welfare impact of foreign studies on 
international migration, in the absence of educational grants, is very difficult 
to assert, as a general proposition.  Instead, the determination of such effects 
requires detailed examination of relatively complex interactions between an 
array of economic factors, which influence individuals’ optimal educational 
investment decisions.  A crucial methodological issue is the non-linearity of 
the welfare changes, reflecting associated brain drain and brain gain effects, 
in relation to the distribution of workers’ productivity levels. Nevertheless, 
when the threshold minimum productivity value, determining whether 
individuals leave, and the maximum attainable level for the population of 
foreign-educated students are both relatively average, in comparison with 
foreign labour-market productivity requirements, the net welfare effect 
resulting from foreign human capital formation is positive, i.e. brain gain 
dominates brain drain.  In this case, welfare is a decreasing function of the 
threshold probability of finding a job abroad, and, thereby, of the 
investment cost differential between foreign and domestic studies. Welfare is 
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also an increasing function of wages paid to foreign-educated skilled 
workers, in either the home, or foreign labour markets, and a decreasing 
function of wages paid to less-skilled domestic-trained workers at home. In 
contrast, either very low, or relatively large values for the fore-mentioned 
productivity parameters foreign studies are associated with detrimental 
welfare implications, since brain drain dominate brain gain effects. 
 
 The analysis has subsequently examined the optimal design and 
relative efficiency implications of three alternative measures, aimed at 
improving economic welfare in the home country by offering financial 
incentives to study abroad, under different informational assumptions.  
These grant schemes, consisting of unconditional grants, and conditional 
grants with, or without, obligations of returning home to work, are initially 
examined while assuming full information regarding the heterogeneous 
abilities.  Somewhat paradoxically, it may be preferable to propose 
unconditional grants to a subset of somewhat less qualified individuals, in 
light of lessened vulnerability to brain drain effects.  Yet, for a constant 
budget, unconditional grants are dominated by conditional grants with an 
optional return.  Nonetheless, in comparison with these two initial grant 
schemes, the relative efficacy of grants with a compulsory return to work 
depend critically on the size of the budgets for funding such programs.  In 
particular, compulsory grants are inferior (superior) to these other grants, 
when funding is relatively limited (generous).  Finally, an extension of the 
analysis to consider grants under asymmetric information establishes that 
when an unconditional grant scheme improves domestic welfare, the extent 
of such an improvement is inversely related to the quality of a home 
country’s initial educational system.  The subsequent analysis also points to a 
strengthened rationale for using grants with a compulsory return, when 
public authorities face informational asymmetries.     
 
Certain potentially fruitful directions for extending the analysis 
proposed here entail incorporating additional modelling features.  These 
include admitting the possibility that domestically educated students can also 
seek employment on the foreign labour market.20  A critical consideration 
would then be the differential probability of finding a foreign job, which 
depends on the gap between the productivity distributions for home and 
foreign-educated domestic workers, as well as the specificity of training to 
employment in different countries.  The latter could be captured by iceberg 
style effects impacting the degree of convertibility of qualifications across 
labour markets.  Clearly, a crucial consideration may be the extent to which 
the educational system in the home country enables particularly capable 
                                                 
20
  Such an extension is relatively straightforward within the present modelling framework, when there is a fixed 
probability of being hired abroad for domestically-trained individuals.   
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students to enhance substantially their productivity levels, or, in other 
words, the extent of educational elitism.  A more detailed analysis of the 
interrelation between alternative educational policies in the home country 
and the extent of brain drain and gain could also consider the interrelation 
between the quality of education offered at different educational levels, the 
pricing of such studies and the extent of their subsidization – both at home 
and abroad.  A basic presumption would be that there are potential welfare 
trade-offs between the budgetary expenses of improving national educational 
offerings and allocating funds for educating students abroad, which could 
depend on the associated net balances between brain drain and gain.  A 
generalization of the present modelling framework could also permit an 
analysis of the strategic interactions arising from alternative educational 
budgetary and policy initiatives in both the home and foreign countries.  
Alternative scenarios relate to the extent to which both implicit and explicit 
government subsidies impact the migration of talent and associated 
implications for the international distribution of welfare.  As in the current 
research, the dependency of such effects on the interrelation between tuition 
fees, underlying educational costs, and the overall quality of educational 
offerings across educational levels and systems internationally will 
potentially be defined by underlying issues of agent heterogeneity and the 
extent of informational asymmetries. 
 
In light of well-known market failures for financing investments in 
human capital, initial income distributions could play a critical role in 
determining whether individuals are prepared to study abroad without 
government funding.  Consequently, an additional policy option could be 
analysed by incorporating alternative hypotheses regarding income and 
asset distributions and introducing unconditional and/or conditional loans 
for less wealthy students.  If educational loans specify that recipients must 
return home to work, they generate only brain gain, thereby enabling 
governments to counter issues of asymmetric information regarding their 
knowledge of individuals’ underlying abilities, since more talented students 
would, ceteris paribus, tend to accept such loans. Finally, a dynamic 
modelling perspective, with alternative assumptions regarding sources of 
underlying individual heterogeneity, could highlight how alternative growth 
paths for the home economy depend on human capital investments in at 
home and/or abroad, eventual migration, and endogenous adjustments in 
wages.  Nonetheless, there are apparent methodological challenges to 
extending the existing heterogeneous-agent framework. 
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APPENDIX 1  
   Consequences of Alternative Employment Policies in the Foreign Country  
 
The analysis here examines the effects of changing the foreign labour 
market requirement parameters, E1and E2.  The specific demonstration of 
Proposition 3 starts by considering a comparative static change in E2 , for a 
given value of E1 :  
2dE
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∂
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,  and re-expressing the term 
algebraically, it follows that 
p
1
N
ee 12−
2dE
Wd∆
 = G( e ) – [( e -I*)(1 - p ) – δ].  Note that G is a positive 
decreasing function of e such that G(e2)= 0, and  ϕ is an increasing function 
of e , for given p .  Consequently, if ϕ(e2) < 0, that is if e2< I*+ p-1
δ
 , 
2dE
Wd∆
 is 
always positive e∀ < e2.  Accordingly, the change in domestic welfare, ∆W, is 
always increasing with e , and so also with E2.  However, if e2> I*+ p-1
δ
, 
there is a threshold value for e  such that beyond this value, ∆W is 
decreasing when E2 and e  increase.  Yet, this threshold value may be 
inferior to e1 , in which case ∆W is always decreasing with E2 .  Furthermore, 
qualitatively similar results hold for an increase in E1 , or for an increase in 
both E1 and E2, when, in the latter case, a constant span E2 – E1 is assumed. 
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APPENDIX 2 
   Unconditional Grants 
 
A starting point for the analysis is the expression of the derivative of 
∆Wb with respect to be . Since the value of the parameter 
12 ee
N
−
does not 
matter here, it can be arbitrarily set equal to 1, in order to simplify the 
notation.  Accordingly, the following expression applies: 
 
=
∆
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It can be seen that 
b
b
ed
Wd∆
 is positive for be = ê1 and negative for be = ê2 .  Of 
particular interest here is the case where e < ê2. The upper limit value for εb 
is, then, e , which corresponds to be  = e - kF .  If 
b
b
ed
Wd∆ ( e ) is negative, 
∆Wb has a maximum for a value of εb strictly inferior to e . On the contrary, 
if )e(
ed
Wd
b
b∆
 is still positive, it means that the optimum corresponds to the 
limit value εb = e .For εb = e , one has:  
=
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with be  = e - kF and, thus,
b
b
ed
Wd∆ ( e )= 2 ϕ ( e ) - ϕ ( e - kF ). Given then 
that ϕ(e) has a maximum for e =E2 /2, it follows that if e ≤E2 /2, 
b
b
ed
Wd∆ ( e ) is 
certainly positive. Actually this is still true, provided e ≤
mine , where mine ∈[ 
E2 /2 , ê2 ] is such that ϕ ( mine ) = 1/2 ϕ (E2 /2). 
When e ∈[ 
mine , ê2 ], the sign of 
b
b
ed
Wd∆ ( e ) depends on the value of F.  More 
precisely, this derivative is negative when F belongs to an interval [F1,F2], for 
which the limits are functions of e , and solutions  of the equation 2 ϕ ( e ) - 
ϕ ( e - kF )= 0. Furthermore, the higher the value of e , the wider is the 
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interval, which has a maximum for  e =  ê2 , corresponding to F1 = 0, F2  = 
k(ê2 - ê1)2. This shows also that for e ∈[ mine , ê2 ] , all F belonging to [F1,F2] 
meet the condition F≤k( e - ê1)2, while this condition is satisfied as an 
equality only for e =ê2 , and F  = F2 .As a result, when 
b
b
ed
Wd∆ ( e ) < 0, the 
change in welfare, ∆Wb , has again an interior maximum for values of be  and 
εb satisfying the equations =
∆ )e(
ed
Wd
b
b
 
ϕ (εb)[ 2
b )ee(
kF
−
 + 1] - ϕ ( be ) = 0   and  
k( e - be ) (εb - be ) = F .When F does not belong to the fore mentioned interval, 
0)e(
ed
Wd
s
s ≥
∆
, so that the maximum value of ∆Ws corresponds to be  = e - kF  
and εb = e .   
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APPENDIX 3 
   Grants with compulsory return 
 
We demonstrate here that, when distributing grants to students whose 
productivity is superior to , the allocation should begin with the brightest 
students ( whose productivity is equal to e2). 
Let us assume that grants are given to students in the productivity interval 
, K, with  ≤  ≤ K ≤ . 
the corresponding welfare benefit is 
& = B
 − ∗
C
K

 
The budget constraint is K − 	
 = $#, and since  = K
∗ −
, this 
constraint can be written K
K − 	
 = ], which gives 
 = K − ]K
 = K −
] − 

K −   
The derivative of W with respect to 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By posing K −  = " , K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"
	 and  
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so that this condition may also be written 
` + " − a ` +
"
 − ∗a >  +
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K −  
But for ≤ K  ,  + " ≥  +
"
K and the condition is always met. 
W is thus an increasing function of K , and the optimum corresponds to 
K = . 
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APPENDIX 4 
   Welfare comparisons 
 
4.1 Proof of Proposition 5 
 
Let %&∗  be the maximal value of & , when a grant is unconditional, which 
corresponds to the optimal values, ∗and ∗ , of the integral limits  and .  
It will be shown that the couple 9:  = ∗ and 9: = ∗  is financially 
attainable in the case of a grant scheme with an optional return. This couple 
results in the same welfare level, %&∗ , as that which pertains to an 
unconditional grant. Consequently, the maximal attainable level of welfare 
in this case is superior, or equal, to %&∗ . 
 
The couple (∗, ∗ ) satisfies naturally the budget constraint for the 
previously analyzed case where there is no conditionality, as specified by 
equation 13: 
 
(25.) (∗ − ∗
 − ∗
 = $# 
The objective then is to demonstrate that for the corresponding values in the 
case of optional return, 9: and 9:, the budgetary constraint for such a 
scheme is not necessarily saturated, i.e.: 
 − ∗
 − ∗B  − 
C ≤ $#
∗
∗
 
Combined with (25.), this inequality may also be expressed as: 
 
B  − 
C ≤  − ∗ 

∗
∗
∗ − ∗
 
 
These inequality conditions hold, since it is straightforward to demonstrate 
that the following equivalent inequality applies: 
 
) C ≥ ∗\b∗ − ∗

∗
∗ . 
 
 
4.2 Proof of Proposition 6 
 
Part a)  
 
An initial comparison is between the welfare effects of unconditional grants, 
as compared with those requiring a compulsory return. First, it will be 
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assumed that the latter grants are distributed only to individuals below the 
threshold .  When the overall educational budget F is quite small, it follows 
that, since H: approaches  , the change in welfare for a scheme with 
compulsory return can be approximated by:  F&H: = ! )  − Y
	C

H: ≅!
  − H:
 − Y
.  In this instance the budget constraint, specified by 
equation 13, amounts to: 
 − H: =  − !
#
H: 
so that 
F&H: ≅  − Y
 #H: = d# 
 
In comparison unconditional grants are distributed on , , where  ≤  
, so that the corresponding budget constraint is given by:  
( −  
 −  
 = $#.  When F is small,  and   are near to  , so that  −  
 ≅ $#. 
Accordingly, the incremental change in welfare is: 
F&e = '( − (B *(
	+( ≅
'
( − ( − 
G



= df# 
By then comparing F&H:and  F&e, it can easily be deduced that for # <
gddh

, a scheme with unconditional grants enhances welfare more than one 
entailing  a compulsory return, so that F&e > F&H: . 
 
Second, for the case where the overall budget, F, is again limited, but the 
conditional grants are distributed in the neighborhood of , the budget 
constraint, provided in equation 30, requires that  −  is proportional to 
F.  The associated welfare change, F&H:Z , is also approximatively 
proportional to  −  and, consequently, also to F.  Hence, the 
demonstration is identical to the previous case.  Finally, in light of  
proposition 5, grants with optional returns dominate unconditional grants, 
so that they are also superior to grants with compulsory return. 
 
Part b)  
 
The demonstration for this scenario where public educational funding is 
relatively unconstrained is rather trivial.  In such a scenario grants with 
compulsory return will be offered to as many of the most capable students, 
as funding will allow, and will then actually be accepted, when the subsidies 
for those individuals are sufficiently large. In contrast, for the unconditional 
and optional return systems, grants will only be allocated to students whose 
abilities are inferior or equal to the threshold .   
